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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

SIRIUS LC, a Wyoming Limited Liability Company,

BRYCE H. ERICKSON, and any person claiming under by or through Bryce H. Erickson in and
to the real property described as follows:
CARIBOU COUNTY, IDAHO:
TOWNSHIP 5 SOUTH, RANGE 46 E.B.M.,
SECTION 27: LOTS 1 AND 2, N112
NW114, EXCEPT THEREFROM THE S %
NE114 NW '/4 NW114,

Supreme Court Docket No. 36466-2009

APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District for Caribou County,
Honorable Mitchell W. Brown, District Judge, presiding.
Bryan D. Smith, Esq., residing at Idaho Falls, Idaho, for Appellant, Bryce I-I. Erickson
A. Bruce Larson, Esq., residing at Pocatello, Idaho, for Respondent, Sirius LC
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In October 1998, Bryce Erickson, a farmerlrancher, retained attorney William Bagley of
Wyoming to file for bankruptcy protection and stay the foreclosure of Erickson's farm. On
October 8, 1998, Bagley filed a petition for Chapter 11 bankruptcy for Erickson. However,
seven months later on May 11, 1999, the court dismissed the bankruptcy for failure to prosecute,
i.e., inability to effectuate a plan, unreasonable delay, failure to prosecute a plan, and failure to
pay quarterly fees. After the bankruptcy was dismissed, Bagley began representing Erickson
outside of bankruptcy against the very same claims of the Chapter 11 creditors. By December 3,
1999, Bagley again filed for bankruptcy protection for Erickson but this time under Chapter 12.
However, before Bagley would agree to file the Chapter 12, Bagley had Erickson sign a
$29,173.38 promissory note and mortgage in favor of plaintiff, Sirius LC ("Sirius"), a limited
liability company Bagley owns, securing the promissory note with Erickson's farm in Caribou
County.
Eventually, the bankruptcy court in the Chapter 12 discovered that Bagley owned the
plaintiff thereby making Bagley a creditor in the Chapter 12 and disqualifying Bagley from
representing Erickson in the Chapter 12 because of a conflict of interest. After the court
disqualified Bagley, Erickson retained Judith A. Shively who successfully completed a court
approved plan of reorganization under Chapter 12. The plaintiff eventually filed this action after
Erickson refused to pay the plaintiff on the promissory note because Bagley's representation of
Erickson in the Chapter 11 and subsequently was incompetent, conflicted, and already over paid
by virtue of a $5,000 retainer Erickson had paid Bagley initially upon filing the Chapter 11.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
In October 1998, Bryce Erickson ("Erickson") and his wife, Kathleen, were in the midst
of a divorce when two bank creditors sought foreclosure of their family farm.' Erickson retained
attorney William Bagley ("Bagley") to file bankruptcy to stay foreclosure of Erickson's family
farm.2 On October 8, 1998, Bagley filed a Voluntary Petition for Chapter 11 for Erickson in the
United States Bankmptcy Court District of

omin in^.^

Just before filing the Chapter 11,

Erickson paid Bagley a $5,000 retainer.4 Bagley had filed between five to seven Chapter 11
bankruptcies before beginning in the 1970s and filed the most recent one two to three years
before

rickso on's.'

Bagley had filed only one Chapter 12 bankruptcy within five years before

filing Erickson's Chapter 11.6

Bagley Fails To Convert From Chapter 11 To Chapter 12
On October 21, 1998 (just 13 days after Bagley filed the Chapter Il), the United States
Congress reenacted Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code retroactive to October 1, 1998.~Bagley
would have initially filed Erickson's bankruptcy as a Chapter 12 if it had been available because
Chapter 12 is preferable to a Chapter 11 for farmers and ranchers.' However, Bagley did not

' S e e William D. Bagley Depo., p. 17, LL. 19-20 in the record on appeal filed as Erickson's Exhibit E; hereafter, this
brief will reference Exhibit E as "Bagley Depo.," followed by the applicable page and line numbers; see Tr Vol. 11,
p. 22, LL. 7-10; the Reporter's Transcript of the 2-day trial does not contain a "Volume I" and a "Volume 11," but
rather contains "Day I" and "Day 11." This brief will cite to "Day I" as "Vol. I" and will cite to "Day II" as "Vol. II";
see R Vol. 11, p. 130; there are actually two Clerk's Records on appeal because this is the second time this case has
been on appeal. This brief will refer to the "Clerk's Record On Appeal," Docket No. 32582 as "Vol. I" and will refer
to the "Limited Clerk's Record on Appeal," Docket No. 36466-2009 as "Vol. 11."
See Bagley Depo., p. 17, LL. 19-20; see R Vol. 11, p. 130.
S e e Erickson Exhibit A-I; see R Vol. 11, p. 130.
"ee Erickson Exhibit A-3; see Bagley
p. 13, L. 25 through p. 14, L. 3 ; see Tr Vol. 11, p. 21, LL. 6-7; p. 92,
- . Depo.,
.
.
LL. 6-17.
' s e e Bagley Depo., p. 8, LL. 12-24; p. 9, LL. 20-21; see Tr. Vol. 11, p. 57, L. 22 through p. 58, L. 10.
6
See Bagley Depo., p. 7, LL. 4-6; p. 8, LL. 6-9; see Tr. Vol. 11, p. 58, LL. 4-10.
' S e e l l U.S.C. Chapter 12 legislative history and comments. See Tr Vol. I, p. 44, LL. 2-24; p. 46, LL. 17-24; p. 47,
LL. 8-16.
' s e e Bagley Depo., p. 7, LL. 7-16; p. 41, L. 20 throughp. 42, L. 11.
~
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know that Congress had reenacted Chapter 1 2 and
~ therefore never considered converting the
Chapter 11 to a Chapter 12 until after the Chapter 11 was dismissed in May 1999." In fact,
Bagley never even knew that the Chapter 11 could have been converted to a Chapter 12" even
though it would have been fairly easy for Bagley to convert from Chapter 11 to Chapter 12.12

Motion for Use of Cash Collateral
On November 9,1998, Bagley filed a "MOTION FOR USE OF CASH COLLATERAL
$363" to obtain money from the bankruptcy estate so that Erickson could pay for the daily
farmtranch operating expenses.13 Although Bagley made the motion over a month after filing the
petition, Bagley admitted he should have filed the motion within days after filing the petition
since Erickson was without cash to operate until the court granted some use of cash collateral.14
Rather than request use of cash collateral for a temporary period before plan confirmation,
Bagley requested use of cash collateral from October 1998 through September 1999." Bagley
also requested $167,205 in cash collateral.16
On November 19, 1998, the court entered an "EMERGENCY ORDER AUTHORIZING
LIMITED USE OF CASH COLLATERAL" authorizing $23,850 use of cash collateral "to pay
identified emergency post petition debts due . . . in October, November and December of
1998."17 On November 20, 1998, the court entered the "NOTICE OF FINAL HEARTNG" on the
motion for use of cash collateral to be held on December 22, 1998.18 But on December 18, 1998,

See Bagley Depo., p. 42, LL. 12-23.
See Bagley Depo., p. 47, LL. 5-8.
" See Bagley Depo., p. 42, LL. 12-24; see Tr Vol. 11, p. 101, LL. 15-20.
See Tr Vol. I, p. 49, LL. 12-24; p. 51, LL. 6-1 1.
" See Erickson Exhibit A-6.
l4 See Bagley Depo., p. 94, L. 17 through p. 95, L. 2; p. 129, L. 20 through p. 130, L. 12: see Tr Vol. I, p. 83, LL. 14lo

''

"".
7n

'*SeeErickson Exhibit A-6; see Bagley Depo., p. 102, LL. 2-20; see Tr Vol. I, p. 83, L. 25 through p. 84, L. 20;
l6 See Erickson Exhibit A-6; see Bagley Depo., p. 102, LL. 2-20; see Tr Vol. I, p. 89, L. 11 through p. 90, L. I .
"See Erickson Exhibit A-20; see Bagley Depo., p. 133, L. 8 through p. 134, L. 14.
See Erickson Exhibit A-21.
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Bagley filed a "REQUEST TO CANCEL HEARING to vacate the December 22,1998 final
hearing because Bagley thought Erickson needed "only a nominal amount of additional cash
collateral" and Erickson was "in the process of preparing a plan to be considered by the Creditors
and the Court in early 1999."'~ On December 21, 1998, the court entered an Order canceling the
hearing.''

Bagley never filed another motion for use of cash collateral which left Erickson

without any money to pay the daily fadranch operating expenses from January 1, 1999 until
the bankruptcy was dismissed on May 12, 1999."
Bagley requested to use cash collateral to make payments to Erickson's mother who was
an unsecured ~reditor?~
Bagley's motion also requested to use cash collateral to make payments
to secured creditors rather than payments for daily operating expenses.23 Bagley proposed
paying secured creditor John Deere $7,500 without making payments to other secured creditors
because Erickson "loved his tractor" and wanted to keep itF4 Bagley thought that Erickson could
prefer payments to unsecured creditors (like Erickson's mother and John Deere) over other
secured creditors without raising the ire of the other secured creditors who were not getting
paid.25

Moflon To Join Kathleen AsA Co-Debtor
On December 14, 1998, Bagley began representing Kathleen and Erickson at the same
time and filed a "MOTION TO JOIN" on behalf of Kathleen, while their divorce was pending, to
join Kathleen as co-debtor in Erickson's Chapter 11.'~ Bagley admitted that this motion to join

l 9 See Erickson Exhibit A-3 1; see Bagley Depo., p. 147, L. 25 through p. 148, L. 22.
*'See Erickson Exhibit A-34.
21 See Tr Vol. I, p. 96, L. 12 through p. 98, L. 2; p. 102, L. 20 thorugh p. 103, L. 5.
22
See Erickson Exhibit A-6; see Bagley Depo., p. 116, LL. 13-23; see Tr Vol. I, p. 86, L. 19 through p. 87, L. 25.
23
See Erickson Exhibit A-6; see Bagley Depo., p. 109, L. 12 through p. 110, L. 5; see TI Vol. I, p. 84, L. 2 1 through

86 L. 18; p. 88, L. 1 throughp. 89, L. 10.
'SeeBagley Depo.,p. 109, L. 12 throughp. 110, L. 5; p. 110, L. 22 throughp. 111, L. 5.
25
See Bagley Depo., p. 110, LL. 6-13.
26
See Erickson Exhibit A-35.
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Kathleen had no basis in law or citation to any authority.27 Predictably, the bankruptcy court
denied the motion.28 Bagley billed Erickson for the time he spent making this unsuccessful
motion to join ~athleen.'~
Bagiey's conduct attempting to join Kathleen in Erickson's Chapter 11 did not meet the
standard of care because he should have "jointly administered" the two cases and not sought to
join ~athleen.~'Moreover, Bagley could have obtained a joint stay without filing a petition for
Kathleen if Bagley would have converted to a Chapter 12 because Chapter 12 contains a special
provision not contained in Chapter 11 that provides for an automatic stay for a co-debt~r.~'
On February 19, 1999, Bagley filed a separate Voluntary Petition for Chapter 11
Bankruptcy for Kathleen in the United States Bankruptcy Court District of Wyoming while the
divorce was still pending.32 Bagley has admitted that "there might be a potential conflict" and
has said, "I could see maybe there is a potential conflict" in representing both Erickson and
Kathleen in bankruptcy while they had a pending divorce.33 Bagley has admitted, "they would
have had a divergent interest in preserving the property, maybe one says don't preserve it and the
other says do preserve it."34 Erickson wanted to save his farm and continue to farm it whereas
Kathleen wanted to sell the farm and divide the cash.35 Bagley never disclosed to Erickson that
there was at least a potential conflict of interest in his representing both Erickson and ~ a t h l e e n . ~ ~
Moreover, during the time of concurrently representing Erickson and Kathleen, Bagley
lumped together the legal services he rendered in both bankruptcies and billed them only to
See Bagley Depo., p. 149, LL. 4-23.
See Erickson Exhibit A-37.
29 See Tr Vol. 11, p. 109, LL. 3-8.
See Tr Vol. I, p. 66, L. 15 through p. 67, L. 2; p. 67, LL. 11-25; p. 69, LL.
SeeTrVol. I, p.71:5-73:9;see 1 1 USC $ 1201.
32 See Erickson Exhibit B-1.
"See Bagley Depo., p. 16, LL. 4-7.
34 See Bagley Depo., p. 16, LL. 8-13.
'"ee Tr Vol. 11, p. 22, LL. 11-21;see Bagley Depo., p. 17, L. 10 through p. IS, L. 1 .
' 6 See Bagley Depo., p. 163, L. 21 through p. 164, L. 3; see Tr Vol. 11, p. 29, LL. 3-6.
27

28

"
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rickso on.^'

Bagley has testified, "I didn't distinguish between time spent for her and time spent

for him38.. . I applied it [Erickson's $5,000 retainer] towards the endeavor. I didn't separate the
billing, and the billing after she came on board just accrued, the $5,000 was used up fairly
early."39 Bagley never billed Kathleen for the services he provided her.40

Successive Applications To Employ Professionals
On December 8, 1998, Bagley filed three applications to retain professionals, a
"DEBTOR-IN-POSSESSION'S APPLICATION FOR ORDER ALLOWING RETENTION OF
ACCOUNTANT," a "DEBTOR-IN-POSSESSION'S APPLICATION FOR ORDER
ALLOWING RETENTION OF ATTORNEY," and a "DEBTOR-IN-POSSESSION'S
APPLICATION FOR ORDER ALLOWING RETENTION OF

REALTOR."^' On December 11,

1998, the court entered three separate orders, "ORDER REGARDING COMPLIANCE WITH
RULES," each denying one of the three applications because they did not include verified
statements of the person to be employed as required by law.42
On December 21, 1998, Bagley filed a "VERIFIED STATEMENT OF ATTORNEY," and
on December 23,1998 the court entered an "ORDER FOR DEBTOR-IN-POSSESSION TO
RETAIN ATTORNEY," allowing retention of Bagley as attorney.43 However, after Bagley filed
a "VERIFIED STATEMENT OF REALTOR" on December 30, 1998, the court for the second
time entered two orders on January 4, 1999 denying both of the applications for retention of the
accountant and the realtor due to non-compliance with the December 11, 1998 0rder.4~

See Bagley Depo., p. 11, L. 14 through p. 14, L. 9.
38SeeBagley Depo., p. 12, LL. 23-24.
39 See Bagley Depo., p. 12, LL. 12-16.
40
See Bagley Depo., p. 18, LL. 9-16; seeTr Vol. 11, p. 105, LL. 2-5.
See Erickson Exhibits A-24 through 26.
"See Erickson Exhibits A-28 through 30.
43 See Erickson Exhibits A-33, A-36.
"See Erickson Exhibits A-40 through 42.
37
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On February 19, 1999, Bagley once again filed a "DEBTOR-IN-POSSESSION'S
APPLICATION FOR ORDER ALLOWING RETENTION OF ACCOUNTANT" accompanied
by a "VERIFIED STATEMENT OF ACCOUNTANT," and a "DEBTOR-IN-POSSESSION'S
APPLICATION FOR ORDER ALLOWING RETENTION OF REALTOR" accompanied by a
"VERIFIED STATEMENT OF

REALTOR."^'

For the third time, on February 23, 1999, the

court entered an "ORDER REGARDING COMPLIANCE WITH RULES," denying these two
applications and emphasizing the lack of compliance with the "provisions of Fed. R. Bankr. P.

2014" and for not setting forth "the person's connection with * * * the United States trustee, or
any person employed in the office of the United States trustee."46
On March 11, 1999, Bagley filed a "VERIFIED STATEMENT OF ACCOUNTANT," and
on March 16,1999 Bagley filed a "VERIFIED STATEMENT OF

REALTOR."^^

The court

subsequently entered the "ORDER FOR DEBTOR-IN-POSSESSION TO RETAIN
ACCOUNTANT" and the "ORDER FOR DEBTOR-IN-POSSESSION TO RETAIN
REALTOR on March 16, 1999 and March 17, 1999, respectively, over 98 days after filing the
initial applications.48
Bagley Claims He Voluntarily Dismissed The Chapter 11

Bagley has testified that he "voluntarily dismissed" Erickson's Chapter 1

for the

following reasons:

*

Bagley wanted to end the "misery" of "accounting and procedures, court
involvement, costs, ongoing costs for court and trustee fees and other things that
were not necessary" and it was "not going anywhere";50

45

See Erickson Exhibits A-46 through 49.
See Erickson Exhibit A-50 (with original emphasis).
47 See Erickson Exhibits A-56 through 57.
See Erickson Exhibits A-58, A-60.
49SeeBagleyDepo., p. 26, LL. 13-21;p.27, L. 2 4 - p . 28, L. 2; p. 28, LL. 12-15.
"See Bagley Depo., p. 26, L. 22 throughp. 27, L. 9; p. 28, L. 22 -p. 29, L. 4; p. 29, LL. 12-16; p. 31, LL. 16-19.
46
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*

Bagley "thought we could work with the creditors" outside of bankruptcy;5'
Bagley "thought maybe that we could get some roperty sold after it was
dismissed and deal with the creditors that way"; Pz
Bagley thought "[ilt was seemingly more possible outside than in" bankruptcy;53
Working with the creditors outside of bankruptcy would save "in attorney fees
and continuing
"Bryce would no longer be incurring attorneys fees" because "maybe some
property would sell and it would get over with, the debts would be paid and we
would live happily ever after'"55
"It wouldn't work, it was a squarepeg in a round hole";56
The bankruptcy "had ceased to serve the purpose" because "the foreclosures were
ended";57
"[Dlealing with the court requirements, which are extensive," were "not
productive";58
"It would have been impossible to get a plan confirmed in two cases, at least it
seemed impossible and it was not getting us anywhere";59
Getting both plans confirmed couldn't be done since it was just too difficult to do
and too expensive, and "[tlhe working out of two files . . . was less desirable than
working outside of bankruptcy court";60
Bagley could see that it was not going to be possible to get a plan confirmed for
Erickson in the Chapter 11 because Kathleen could not be j ~ i n e d ; ~ '
Bagley felt "[tlhe bankruptcy at that point was just not as necessary";62
Having two separate cases was "at best awkward";63

See Bagley Depo., p. 27, LL. 10-13.
See Bagley Depo., p. 49, L. 17 through p. 50, L. 4.
53 See Bagley Depo., p. 50, L. 21 through p. 51, L. 3.
5 4 ~ eBagley
e
Depo., p. 27, LL. 14-17; p. 31, L. 20 through p. 32, L. 1.
5' See Bagley Depo., p. 32, LL. 2-7 (emphasis added).
56 See Bagley Depo., p. 47, L. 9 through p. 48, L. 2 (emphasis added).
57 See Bagley Depo., p. 29, LL. 5-1 1.
58 See Bagley Depo., p. 40, LL. 4-15.
59 See Bagley Depo., p. 40, LL. 16-21.
60 See Bagtey Depo., p. 51, LL. 12-18.
6'See Bagley Depo., p. 171, LL. 18-23.
62SeeBagley Depo., p. 51, LL. 4-11.
See Bagley Depo., p. 25, LL. 20-25.
'I
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*
*
*
*
*

Bagley did not get the Chapter 11 "shaped
"It's always more desirable to be able to accomplish something out of court than
in ~ourt";6~
Bagley thought "we had established some dialogue with the

creditor^";^^

Bagley thought "[tlhere was some property that was being sold and about to be
sold, could be s0ld";6~and
Bagley thought "[tlhere were scenarios that we could deal with that didn't involve
the court, and adding that to the complication of dealing through the court in that
particular configuration, the desirability of dealing with it on the outside
impractical aspects of dealing with it on the inside of the court

In short, Bagley has clearly and unequivocally testified that "ultimately we weren't thrown out of
court," but rather, Bagley "voluntarily dismissed" the Chapter 11 for his stated host of reasons.69

Court Involuntarily Dismisses Chapter I1 For Failure To Prosecute
On March 3, 1999, the United States Trustee filed its "UNITED STATES TRUSTEE'S
MOTION TO

DISMISS."^^

The motion claimed that the debtor had filed for Chapter 11 on

October 8, 1998, but had not filed a plan and a disclosure statement and had made little progress
in advancing the case to ~onfirmation;~'
the case did not involve any complicated issues of law
or fact which prevented the debtor from filing a plan and a disclosure statement and prosecuting
the debtor had made the unsuccessful motion to join ~ a t h l e e nBagley
;~~
them to confirmati~n;~~
had not provided disclosure to the court that he had begun to represent Kathleen while

"See Bagley Depo., p. 174, LL. 1-7.
See Bagley Depo., p. 52, LL. 13-14.
66
See Bagley Depo., p. 52, LL. 15
67 See Bagley Depo., p. 52, LL. 16-18.
See Bagley Depo., p. 52, LL. 18-23.
6 9 ~ e e ~ a g lDepo.,p.
ey
181, LL. 11-17.
70
See Erickson Exhibit A-52; see Bagley Depo., p.
" See Erickson Exhibit A-52; see Bagley Depo., p.
"See Erickson Exhibit A-52; see Bagley Depo., p.
73 See Erickson Exhibit A-52; see Bagley Depo., p.
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concurrently representing Erickson during the pendency of their divorce;74Bagley had delayed
the administration of the bankruptcy by not taking the steps to retain a real estate broker;75and
did not file complete monthly financial reports since they did not contain the Form 2-B, a
balance sheet, profit and loss statement, supporting schedules, narrative, and bank

statement^.^^

On March 16, 1999, First National Bank filed a "JOINDER IN MOTION TO DISMISS"
to join in the United States Trustee's motion.77 The motion claimed that Bagley had spoken to
counsel for the bank in December 1998 regarding a draft disclosure statement and never further
contacted counsel for the bank or served any plan or disclosure statemenC7' the plan and
disclosure statement were not filed within 120-days of filing the petition;79the debtor had never
reported on or accounted for his use of any cash coil at era^;'^ there was no apparent progress
towards the filing of a confirmable plan;81and the debtor was sitting back and enjoying the
protection of the automatic stay without making a serious effort to prosecute the case."
On March 17, 1999, First Security Bank filed its "JOINDER IN MOTION OF OFFICE
OF UNITED STATES TRUSTEE TO DISMISS CHAPTER 11

CASE."'^

The motion claimed

that since filing his case, the debtor's only substantive action consisted of a motion to use cash
collateral, which was granted but only to a limited extent;84the debtor had been delinquent in
paying fees to the U.S. Trustee's office and in filing financial reports;85the financial reports that
had been filed omitted the majority of information which was meaningful to creditors in
7"ee Erickson ExhibitA.52; see Bagley Depo., p. 153, L. 16 through p.
75 See Erickson Exhibit A-52; see Bagley Depo., p. 154, L. 13 through p.
76 See Erickson Exhibit A-52; see Bagley Depo., p. 155, L. 18 through p.
77 See Erickson Exhibit A.59.
78SeeErickson Exhibit A-59.
79 See Erickson Exhibit A.59; see Bagley Depo., p. 170, LL. 12-16.
See Erickson Exhibit A.59; see Bagley Depo., p. 170, L. 17 through p.
" See Erickson Exhibit A-59; see Bagley Depo., p. 172, L. 18 through p.
82 See Erickson Exhibit A-59.
83 See Erickson Exhibit A.61.
"See Erickson Exhibit A-61: see Bdgley Depo., p. 174, LL. 14-19.
"See Erickson Exhibit A-61; see Bagley Depo., p. 174, LL. 20-23.
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assessing the debtor's prospects of reorganization, like balance sheets and profit and loss
statements;@the debtor's deadline for filing his plan had expired;87Bagley had made no contact
or communications regarding the plan or disclosure statement since December 1 9 9 8 ; dismissal
~~
was warranted under 11 USC Section 1112(b), for cause, including inability to effectuate a plan,
unreasonable delay by the debtor which is prejudicial to creditors, failure to prosecute a plan
within any time fixed by the court or statute, and failure to pay quarterly fees to the U.S.
~rustee.~~
On April 1, 1999, the court entered an "ORDER RULING ON MOTIONS AND
REQUIRING ACTION in which the court ordered that the "debtors shall file original, signed
disclosure statements and plans of reorganization in each case and as separate documents, at
which time the court will set the disclosure statements for hearing." 90 Bagley says that this order
"tells me that I am doing too good of a job of getting Bryce time."91
On April 14, 1999, the court entered its first "ORDER ON THE UNITED STATES
TRUSTEE'S MOTION TO DISMISS" in which the court stated that "[tlhe following matters
need to be addressed by the debtor within ten days from the date of the hearing:
1.

The debtor shall file amended monthly financial reports and a monthly financial
report for March 1999 which are in compliance with the operating guidelines of
the Untied States Trustee;

2.

Mr. Bagley shall file a supplemental application to employ which provides
complete disclosure about his representation of Kathleen Erickson in Case
~ u k b e 99-20162;
r
and

3.

The debtor shall provide proof of in~urance."~~

See Erickson Exhibit A-61; see Bagley Depo., p. 176, LL. 5-11.
See Erickson Exhibit A-61.
88SeeErickson Exhibit A-61; see Bagley Depo., p. 176, L. 25 through p. 177, L. 20.
89 See Erickson Exhibit A-61; see Bagley Depo., p. 178, LL. 9-11.
9 0 ~ eErickson
e
Exhibit A-69.
9'See Bagley Depo., p. 182, LL. 8-13.
92 See Erickson Exhibit A-74.
87
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On May 12,1999, the court entered its second "ORDER ON THE UNITED STATES
TRUSTEE'S MOTION TO DISMISS" in which the court ruled that "[ulpon consideration of the
statements of counsel and a review of the materials on file and in accordance with oral findings
made of record, the Court finds that there is sufficient cause for dismissal of this case pursuant to
11 U.S.C. Section 1112(b). ORDERED that this case is dismi~sed."~~

Bagley Continues Representing Erickson Afer Dismissal
After the dismissal of Erickson's Chapter 11, Bagley continued to represent Erickson
billing him $4,323.57 from June 3, 1999 through October 27, 1 9 9 9 . ~During
~
this time, Bagley
spent time and billed for trying to work out creditor claims and preparing and organizing to file a
Chapter 12 petition for

ricks on?^

Bagley cannot differentiate between the time he spent

preparing the Chapter 12 petition and other work that he was doing for

ricks on.^^

Bagley Has Erickson Sign A Promissory Note And Mortgage
On November 13, 1999, Bagley had Erickson sign a "PROMISSORY NOTE" payable to
Sirius LC, a company owned exclusively by Bagley and his wife, and "REAL ESTATE
MORTGAGE," with Sirius LC as mortgagee, to secure payment of Bagley's attorney's fees and
costs incurred from October 8, 1998 through November 13, 1999 in the amount of $29,173.38.97
Because the amount of the note does not include the $5,000 Erickson paid initially upon the

9 3 ~ eErickson
e
Exhibit A-87.
9 9 e e Erickson Exhibits C-51 through 57; see Tr Vol. 11, p. 95, L. 23 through p. 96, L. 24.
95
See Bagley Depo., p. 79, L. 13 through p. 81, L. 1; see Erickson Exhibits C-51 through 59, C-81 through 83, C-86
through C-88, C-97through 99.
9 6 ~ eBagiey
e
Depo., p. 81, LL. 7-14.
9 7 ~ eSirius
e
Exhibits 1-2; see Bagtey Depo., p. 18, L. 24 through p. 19, L. 6; p. 20, LL. 15-20; see R Vol. 11, pp. 130171~
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filing of the Chapter 11, Bagley actually charged Erickson $34,173.38 for attorney's fees from
October 8, 1998 through November 13, 1 9 9 9 . ~ ~
The "REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE" Erickson signed was for his family farm, which
consisted of 172.35 acres.99 This property is known as the "Deer Creek Property" with a stated
value on December 9, 1998 of $688,000 and a stated value on December 3, 1999 of $602,000.'~~
Before Erickson signed the note and mortgage, Bagley never gave Erickson a reasonable
opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal counsel regarding signing the note and
mortgage.lO' Before he signed the note and mortgage, Erickson did not sign a writing consenting
to the terms of the transaction that Bagley had fully disclosed to Erickson in writing.'02
Bagley is unable to provide any records, itemizations, or billings documenting how he
charged for services performed for the time period between October 1998 (when Bagley first
started representing Erickson) and May 12, 1999 (bankruptcy dismissa1.)lo3 Bagley has no way
to show what services he provided during this time.lo4 Bagley has no accounting or breakdown
for what he charged to arrive at any figure let alone the amount in the promissory note.'''

This

means Bagley has no accounting to show how much of the note is for costs as opposed to
attorney's fees.lo6 In fact, Bagley says it is "improbable" that he could even recreate the billing
for the work he performed for his services.lo7

Bagley Depo., p. 20, L. 25 through p. 21, L. 14; see Tr Val. 11, p. 92, LL. 6-16.
Sirius Exhibit 2.
loo See Erickson Exhibits A-27, D-30.
''I See Tr Vol. 11, p. 81, L. 18 through p. 82, L. 18.
'''See Tr Vol. 11, p. 82, L. 19 through p. 84, L. 16.
'''See Tr Vol. 11, p. 92, L. 21 through p. 93, L. 15.
See Bagley Depo., p. 70, LL. 15-19.
'''See Bagley Depo., p. 70, LL. 20-25.
'06 See Tr Vol. 11, p. 91, LL. 7-20.
'''See Bagley Depo., p. 70, L. 25 through p. 71, L. 2.

" See
99 See
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Bagley's post-dismissal billing records that do exist (that include a prior balance through
dismissal) total about $900 less than the stated amount of the promissory note, and Bagley has no
explanation for the discrepancy stating, "I don't know where I got the figure for the note."108
Moreover, Bagley testified that the note reflected a charge of $165 per hour for services he
provided during the Chapter 11.Io9 However, Bagley's disclosure of compensation filed in the
Chapter 11 on October 8, 1998 and verified statement of attorney filed December 21, 1998 state
that Bagley was to charge only $140 per hour for his

service^."^

Furthermore, the "UNITED STATES TRUSTEE'S STATUS REPORT" dated April 19,
1999 refers to a March 1999 monthly financial report and states that "[tlhe debtor states on the
report that Mr. Bagley is owed $7,000 in fees over the retainer.""' This statement is attributable
to Bagley who prepared the March 1999 report him~elf."~
The import of this statement is that
$7,000 plus the original $5,000 retainer equals $12,000 in fees through March 1999 for a case
dismissed in May 1999. Since Bagley's post dismissal billing statements show a previous
balance before June 3, 1999 of $23,668.57,'13Bagley must have billed $11,668.57 for services
for April 1999, May 1999, and the first two days in June 1999. However, Bagley provided no
evidence at trial explaining what services he performed during this time although whatever he
did resulted in a dismissal for failure to prosecute.
Chapter 12 Bankruptcy Court Disqualifies Bagley From Representing Erickson
On December 3, 1999, Bagley filed a Voluntary Petition for Chapter 12 Bankruptcy for
Erickson in the United States Bankruptcy Court District of Wyoming and a "DEBTOR-IN-

Io8
lo9
'lo

See TI Vol. 11, p. 96, L. 25 through p. 97, L. 16.
See Bagley Depo., p. 22, L. 24 through p. 23, L. 5; see also Erickson Exhibits C-51 through 57.
See Erickson Exhibit A-3, A-33.
See Erickson Exhibit A-82, p. 3 (emphasis added).
See Tr Vol. 11, p. 127, LL. 7-10.
See Erickson Exhibit C-5 1.

"'
"3
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POSSESSION'S APPLICATION FOR ORDER ALLOWING RETENTION OF ATTORNEY"
seeking court approval to retain himself as attorney for

rickso on."^

This application makes no

mention of Bagley being a listed as a creditor of Erickson's estate by virtue of the Sirius
promissory note and mortgage."'

On December 15,1999, the court entered an "ORDER

REGARDING COMPLIANCE WITH RULES" denying the application for failure to comply
with Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2014 that required an accompanying verified statement of the person to be
emp10yed.l'~(This was the very same noncompliance problem with the successive applications
in the Chapter 11.) On December 29, 1999, Bagley refiled the "DEBTOR-IN-POSSESSION'S
APPLICATION FOR ORDER ALLOWING RETENTION OF ATTORNEY" (without an
accompanying affidavit) to retain himself as an attorney and this time disclosed that "William D.
Bagley is a listed creditor of the estate in the amount of $29,175, which debt is secured by a third
mortgage on 172

acre^.""^

This second application further states that "[hle, as the attorney

sought to be retained herein, bears no known interest adverse to the debtor [or], creditors. . . .,, 118
Eventually, the court discovered that Bagley was indeed a creditor and disqualified him
explaining, "[oln January 3,2000, the court inadvertently entered the order authorizing
employment of Mr. Bagley, even though counsel had not filed the requisite and proper affidavit
and disclosure ~tatement.""~The court's later review of the file reflected that Bagley was a
secured creditor by virtue of the note and mortgage with ~ i r i u s . '"The
~ ~ court ordered the debtor
to file a statement regarding the nature of Mr. Bagley's relationship to Sirius, LC. The debtor did
not comply. Not until a hearing held May 24,2000, did the court realize its error in authorizing
See Erickson Exhibits D-20, D-48.
See Erickson Exhibit D-48.
Ii6seeErickson Exhibit D-51.
Ii7seeErickson Exhibit D-53.
See Erickson Exhibit D-53.
"9 See Erickson Exhibit D-156, D-7.
Iz0 See Erickson Exhibit D-156.
lid
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Mr. Bagley's employment."12' Accordingly, on June 6,2000 the court entered the "ORDER
RESCINDING ORDER FOR DEBTOR IN POSSESSION TO RETAIN ATTORNEY,'!
disqualifying Bagley from representing Erickson, and concluding that "counsel cannot hold an
interest adverse to the estate," "Mr. Bagley is a creditor," and "[tlhe security interest in estate
property [i.e., the promissory note and mortgage in this case] could possibly be a preferential
transfer."122 Thus, Bagley's attorney-client relationship with Erickson in the Chapter 12 came to
an end on June 6,2000 even though Bagley's billing records show he continued to represent

Erickson until August 28, 2 0 0 0 . ' ~ ~
Bagley never disclosed to Erickson his conflict of interest that existed and that ultimately
disqualified him from the Chapter 12 proceedings.124Bagley testified he did not have a conflict
of interest; that he "[was] accomplishing for [Erickson] what any attorney would be able to do . .

. with or without [a conflict];" and that Bagley discovered the "conflict" only after the
bankruptcy court disqualified him.125Even now, Bagley's perception is that the court
disqualified him on the pretext of a creditor-attorney conflict.lZ6Bagley has testified that "the
judge was happy to see me go . . . because I was doing too good of a job."127
Erickson Retains New Bankruptcy Counsel
On December 20,2000, Erickson retained Judith A. Shively (hereinafter "Shively") as
new counsel for Erickson's Chapter 12.12' Shively has been doing Chapter 12 bankruptcies for

See Erickson Exhibit D-156 through 157.
See Erickson Exhibits D-156 through 157.
'23 See R Vol. 11, p. 35; see Erickson Exhibit C-68.
I2"ee Bagley Depo., p. 84, LL. 12-17; p. 87, L. 19 through p. 88, L. 20; see TI Vol. 11, p. 27, L. 24 through p. 28, L.
3; p. 28, L. 25 through p. 29, L. 2; p. 121, L. 18 through p. 122, L. 7.
SeeBagley Depo., p. 57, L. 14 through p. 58, L. 6; p. 86, L. 15 through p. 87, L. 18; see Tr Vol. 11, p. 121, LL.
11-17.
126
See Bagley Depo., p. 61, L. 5 through p. 63, L. 6.
127 See Bagley Depo., p. 61, L. 20 through p. 63, L. 1.
12* See Erickson Exhibit D-8, docket 73.
12'

'22
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over twenty years and has successfully completed between 25-30 Chapter 12 bankruptcies.'29
Shively has successfully completed 15-20 Chapter 11 bankruptcies for farmers.'30 On June 4,

2001, Erickson's Chapter 12 plan was ~onfirmed.'~'On August 30,2006, Erickson received a
discharge after completion of the Chapter 12 plan."132

Bagley s' Conduct Below The Standard Of Care
At trial, the judge stated "[Shively] is competent. I am impressed with her background
and her abi~ities,"'~~
and "Ms. Shively impresses me with her knowledge of the code and her
ability to file

Shively testified that Bagley's conductin representing Erickson

fell below the standard of care in the following respects:

*
*
*

*

Failing to have the information that Chapter 12 had been reenacted and then
failing to convert from a Chapter 11 to a Chapter 12;'~'
Attempting to join Kathleen to Erickson's Chapter 11 rather making a motion to
jointly administer under two separate proceedings;'36
Letting the exclusivity period run,not having filed a plan or disclosure statement
before it ran, and then filing for joint administration after it ran;137
Filing the Motion for Use of Cash Collateral over a month after the Chapter 11
petition was filed instead of within ten days of filing the petition, requesting cash
collateral for an unreasonable amount of time, requesting to use cash collateral in
an incorrect way, requesting such a high amount for cash collateral, not
addressing the adequate protection issue, not communicating with the secured
creditors regarding cash ~ollateral;'~~
requesting to use post petition wages in the
motion for use of cash co~lateral;'~~
vacating the final hearing on the motion for

1 2 9 ~ e e Vol.
T r I, p. 29, LL. 10-13.
130
See Tr Vol. I, p. 30, L. 20 through p. 3 1, L. 3.
13' See Erickson Exhibit D-10, docket 98.
See Erickson Exhibit F.
133 See Tr Vol. I , p. 128, LL. 6-7.
134
See Tr Vol. I, p. 164, LL. 7-8.
SeeTr Vol. I, p. 44, LL. 2-24; p. 46:, LL. 17-24; p. 47, LL. 8-16; p. 64, LL. 14-17.
'j6seeTr Vol. I , p. 66, L. 15 throughp. 67, L.-25; p. 69, LL. 11-13.
137 See Tr Vol. I , p. 75, L. 20 through p. 76, L. 14.
1 3 8 ~ e e ~ rI, ~p. o82,
l . LL. 15-19; p. 83, LL. 10-20; p. 84, L. 15-18; p. 85, LL. 4-13; p. 86, L. 12through p. 87, L. 23;
p. 88, LL. 19-25; p. 89, L. 18 through p. 90, L. 1; p. 91, LL. 13-25; p. 92, LL. 11-19.
"I See Tr Vol. I , p. 103, LL. 18-20.
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use of cash ~ o l l a t e r a l ;and
' ~ ~failing to file another motion for use of cash
collateral after January 1, 1999;14'
~~
in failing to consult
Appointing an accountant late on March 15, 1 9 9 9 ' resulting
an accountant for the motion for use of cash collateral'43and failing to consult
with an accountant for purposes of filing a plan and statement^;'^^
Delaying filing of applications for employment of professionals in accordance
with the relevant rule;145
Failing to include verified statements in the applications for employment of
professionals;'46
Failing again to comply with the relevant rule for filing applications for
employment of professionals;147
Failing yet again to comply with the relevant rule for filing applications for
employment of professionals;'48
Failing conceptually to understand a Chapter 11 and how to complete a Chapter
11 disclosure ~ t a t e m e n t ; ' ~ ~
Failing to file a plan or disclosure statement and making little progress in
advancing the Chapter 11 bankruptcy to c~nfirmation;'~~
Delaying the administration of the Chapter 11;15'
Failing to disclose to the bankruptcy court his representation of both Erickson and
~athleen;'~~
Failing to file complete monthly reports;'s3

'"

See Tr Vol. I , p. 96, L. 16 through p. 98, L. 2.
See Tr Vol. I , p. 102, L. 20 through p. 103, L. 5.
I4'See Tr Val. I, p. 93, LL. 7-15; p. 93, L. 23 through p. 94, L. 5.
'43 See Tr Val. I , p. 93, L. 7 through p. 94, L. 5.
j4"ee TI ~ o lI ,. p. 94, LL. 8-19; p. 95, LL. 20-21.
'05 See Tr Vol. I , p. 110, LL. 19-20; see also Erickson Exhibits A-24 through 26.
See Tr Vol. I , p. 111, LL. 18-23; see also Erickson Exhibits A-28 through 30.
'"See Tr Vol. I , p. 113, LL. 4-10; see also Erickson Exhibits A-41 through 42.
14' See Tr Vof. I, p. 114, LL. 17-24; see also Erickson Exhibit A-50.
1 4 9 ~Tr
e eVal. I , p. 62, LL. 2-5.
'"See Tr Val. I, p. 124, LL. 1-9; see also Erickson Exhibit A-52.
See Tr Val. 1,p. 125, LL. 10-16; see also Erickson Exhibit A-52.
'"See Tr Val. I , p. 125, LL. 5-9; see also Erickson Exhibit A-52.
See Tr Val. I , p. 126, LL. 1-3; see also Erickson Exhibit A-52.
14'

APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
F:\CLIENTS\BDS\74531Pleadings\O67appellate brief doc

Page 20 of 48

*

*

Allowing the Chapter 11 to be dismissed and not curing the deficiencies after
getting a 10 day notice from the court;154and
Representing Erickson in preparing for a Chapter 12 filing that Bagley could not
file."'

Even Bagley has admitted that during the Chapter 11 his only substantive action
consisted of the motion for use of cash collateral, which was granted but only to a limited
extent.Is6 Bagley has further admitted that he was charging Erickson for the legal work the
bankruptcy court found to be insufficient and which ultimately resulted in the Chapter 11's
dismissa~.''~Bagley has admitted that at times during the Chapter 11 he was ineffi~ient."~For
example, Bagley admits that he was not efficient in retaining experts159and probably should not
charge Erickson for the successive applications to retain professionals because of
" i n e f i ~ i e n c ~ . "Finally,
' ~ ~ even Bagley has admitted he should have filed the motion for use of
cash collateral within days (not over one month) after filing the petition.161
Set OffDamages

First Security Bank ("FSB) and First National Bank ("FNB) recovered attorney's fees in
the Chapter 12 for the work their attomeys performed in the Chapter 11 that included the work
they did in bringing motions to dismiss the Chapter 11.I6' Bagley testified that Erickson had to
pay these creditors' attorney's fees for the work the creditors' attomeys did in the dismissed

Is4 See Tr Vol. I, p. 131, LL. 19-25; p. 134, LL. 1-5; see also Erickson Exhibits A-74, A-87.
'"See Tr Vol. I , p. 179, LL. 10-18.
lS6 See Bagley Depo., p. 174, LL. 14-19.
'"see Bagley Depo., p. 187, LL. 16-18.
see Tr Val. 11, p. 122, LL. 21-25.
See TI Vol. 11, p. 77 LL. 7-8.
See Bagley Depo., p. 146, LL. 15-19.
Is' See Bagley Depo., p. 94, L. 17 through p. 95, L. 2; see also TI Vol. I , p. 82, L. 10 through p. 83, L. 20.
I6'See Tr Vol. I , p. 190, L. 16 through p. 192, L. 1; p. 193, L. 13 through p. 194, L. 18; p. 197, L. 13 through p. 198,
L. 9.
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Chapter 11

Because Erickson could not locate the attorney billings for trial, Shively offered

expert testimony based on her review of the work the attorneys for the bank performed that FSB
incurred and recovered conservatively $9,750 in attorney's fees'64and that FNB incurred and
recovered conservatively $8,500 in attorney's fees.165Additionally, on November 13, 1999,
Erickson paid Bagley $3,000 that Bagley applied to pay for the services he performed in
connection with the Chapter 12 that he could not perform because of a conflict of interest.'66
Finally, Shively further testified that if Bagley had converted to a Chapter 12 ~ a ~would
l e not
~
have needed to file any bankruptcy petition for ~ a t h l e e nthus
' ~ ~avoiding $830 for the filing fee
for Kathleen's Chapter 11 petition.'68
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 2,2004, Sirius filed a "COMPLAINT FOR FORECLOSURE" in the District
Court of the Sixth Judicial District in and for the County of

The Complaint alleged

that Erickson signed a promissory note and mortgage and that Erickson defaulted on the note.17'
Sirius prayed for foreclosure of Erickson's mortgaged farm property.171
On October 28,2004, Erickson filed apro se "ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT FOR

FORECLOSURE."'^^
"AMENDED

On January 3,2005, after retaining legal counsel, Erickson filed an

ANSWER."'^^

In the AMENDED ANSWER, Erickson admitted to signing the

See Bagley Depo., p. 62, LL. 10-17; p. 63, L. 7-9; p. 64, L. 1 through p. 65, L. 4; p. 192, L. 13 throughp. 194, L.
9.
see ~r VOI. I, p. 193, LL. 13-19.
I6'See Tr Vol. I, p. 197, LL. 13-24.
lG6seeErickson Exhibit C-58; see Bagley Depo., p. 88, L. 25 through p. 89, L. 10; see Tr Vol. 11, p. 97, LL. 17-19.
167SeeTrVol.I, p. 71, L. 5 through p. 73, L. 21; see also 11 USC 5 1201.
16'see Erickson Exhibit B-l .
See R Vol. I, p. 1.
I" See R Vol. I, pp. 2-4.
17' See R Vol. I, pp. 5-6.
'"See R Vol. I, p. 13.
""ee
RVol. I, p.20.
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note and the mortgage that were attached as exhibits to the ~ o m ~ 1 a i n tFurthermore,
.l~~
Erickson's AMENDED ANSWER admitted to not having paid the $29,173.38 amount of the
note.'75 However, Erickson alleged numerous defenses, asserting, inter alia, the doctrine of set
off, adequacy of consideration, and the note and mortgage were void and ~nenforceable."~
The

On August 23,2005, the court, sua sponte, granted summary judgment to
court reasoned that "[tlhere is nothing in the record to indicate any fraud, undue influence,

misrepresentation, or any other defense alleged in [Erickson's] amended answer."'78 The court
also denied Erickson's prior "MOTION TO COMPEL" discovery related to his defenses, which
were the same defenses the court concluded Erickson had failed to support, deeming the
"MOTION TO COMPEL" to be "moot."'79 On that same day, the court entered "JUDGMENT"
in favor of ~ i r i u s . ' ~ ~
On December 14,2005, Erickson appealed.'81 On appeal in Sirius LC v. Erickson, 144
Idaho 38 (2007), the Supreme Court vacated the JUDGMENT and held that the district court had
abused its discretion in denying Erickson's motion to compel production of documents pertaining
to his affirmative defenses. Although the court found that "Erickson received consideration for
the note, we do not opine as to the adequacy of the eon~ideration."'~~
On March 28,2007, the
Supreme Court remanded for firther proceedings on Erickson's affirmative defenses.
On June 6,2008, the court on remand held a hearing on pretrial motions where the court
indicated that it would allow Bagley to testify as an expert even though the plaintiff failed to
RVol. I , pp. 21-22.
See R Vol. I , p. 22.
I7'See R Vol. I , pp. 22-23.
'77 See R Vol. I , pp. 29 and 38.
See R Vol. 1, p. 36.
179 See R Vol. I , p. 38.
180
See R Vol. I, p. 40.
See R Vol. 1, 54.
See Sirius LC v. Erickson, 144 Idaho 38,43, fn. 2 (2007) ("While we hold that Erickson received consideration
for the note, we do not opine as to the adequacy of the consideration.")
174 See
17'

p.
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disclose him as an expert in discovery and never disclosed him as an expert pursuant to the
court's pretrial order.Is3 The court reasoned that Bagley "is a lawyer and that is the whole issue
about this thing."lS4
On June 13,2008, Erickson filed an "OBJECTION TO ALLOWING WILLIAM
BAGLEY TO TESTIFY AS AN EXPERT AND A MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL

SETTING."'^^

Erickson made the objection on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed to

disclose Bagley as an expert witness in the plaintiff's discovery responses (even though Erickson
specifically asked for this inf~rmation)'~~
and failed to "disclose in writing" Bagley as an expert
witness "together with a summary of the testimony" Bagley intended to offer, as required in the
"ORDER FOR TRIAL, PRE-TRIAL SCHEDULE, AND PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE" dated
August 9,2007.'~' The objection sought an order precluding Bagley from testifying as an expert
witness or, alternatively, a continuance for Erickson to obtain in discovery Bagley's expert
opinions and the bases thereof.Is8
On June 23,2008, the court denied the objection and motion for a c o n t i n ~ a n c e . 'The
~~
court further overruled Erickson's objection to allowing Bagley to testify as an expert witness.lgO
During trial, Erickson renewed his objection against allowing Bagley to testify as an expert
witness due to failure to disclose Bagley as an expert during discovery, but the court still allowed
Bagley to testify as an expert.191

"'See Tr Val. 111, p. 41, L. 3 through p. 42, L. 23. This brief will refer to the Reporter's Transcript dated June 6,
2008 as "Val. 111."
1 8 4 ~ e e ~ r111,
~ op.l 41,
. LL. 11-13.
'''See R Val. 11, p. 82.
See R Vol. 11, pp. 30-3 1.
'"See R Val. 11, p. 83; see "ORDER FOR TRIAL, PRE-TRIAL SCHEDULE, AND PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE"
dated August 9,2007 as a document contained in the augmented record on appeal.
'" See R Vol. 11, pp. 82-85.
'"See Minute Entry and Order dated June 25,2007 as a document contained in the augmented record on appeal.
See Minute Entry and Order dated June 25,2007 as a document contained in the augmented record on appeal.
19' See TI Vol. II., p. 6 1 LL. 9-21.
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On June 30, 2008 and June 31,2008, trial was held.'92 On the first day of trial, Erickson
stipulated that the plaintiff had proven its case regarding the promissory note and mortgage
subject to Erickson's affirmative defenses.'93 In other words, Erickson stipulated that he signed
the promissory note and mortgage, that Erickson had not paid any amount on the promissory
note, that the numbers alleged in the complaint are accurate, etc. and that the issues to be tried
were those raised by Erickson's affirmative defenses.'94 The court accepted the stipulation, the
plaintiff rested, and Erickson began putting on evidence addressing the affirmative defenses he
raised.I9'
Shivley testified that a reasonable amount of attorney's fees for the work Bagley
performed would have been $2,227.50.'~~She based this amount on the bankruptcy code section
that would have applied to any fee request Bagley might have made had the court not dismissed
the Chapter 11.'97 She based her opinion on her review of the entire Chapter 11 file, her
experience in filing 10-15 Chapter 11 fee applications, her experience with Chapter 11 and
Chapter 12 fee applications other attorneys have filed because the requirements are the same for
both Chapter 11 and Chapter 12, her 22 years experience, and the value of the work Bagley
performed and conferred as the rule requires.19* However, the court would not admit Shively's
testimony because earlier she had testified that she does not "have specialized training in
determining
On September 30,2008, the trial court entered its "FINDINGS OF FACTS AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER," and it entered
See Tr Vol. I and Tr Vol. 11.
Tr Vol. I, p. 5, L. 25 through p. 8, L. 6.
I9'See Tr Vol. I , p. 5, L. 25 through p. 8, L. 6.
"* See Tr Vol. I, p. 8, LL. 19-22.
196
See Tr Vol. 1, p. 199, L. 6 through p. 200, L. 4.
"'See Tr Vol. I , p. 199, L. 6-20.
I9'See Tr Vol. I , p. 200, L. 22 through p. 203, L. 7.
I g 9 See Tr Vol. I , p. 36, LL. 18-21.(emphasisadded); p. 203, LL. 8-17,
19*

l g 3 See
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"JUDGMENT" again in favor of ~ i r i u s The
. ~ ~court
~ ruled that the note is valid and that
Erickson is "obligated to pay the full amount of the note plus interest and attorney's fees as
provided in the note and mortgage."201After ruling that the court would not consider any of
Erickson's affirmative defenses because they were directed against Bagley and not Sirius, who is
the party to the

the court found that (1) the legal work Bagley performed was adequate

to support the note;'03 (2) Bagley did not have a conflict in representing Erickson and Kathleen at
the same time;204(3) the amount of fees Bagley charged was reasonable;205and (4) Bagley did
not violate Wyoming Rule of Professional Responsibility 1.8(a) because the note and mortgage
were provided as consideration and not as a security interestzo6 "[Oltherwise, no attorney could
enter into agreements for payment as they would be in conflict with their clients thereafter."2o7
On October 14,2008, Erickson filed a "MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR, IN

THE ALTERNATIVE,FOR A NEW TRIAL.*~O~
On April 1,2009, the trial court entered its "MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER ON ERICKSON'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR, IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, FOR A NEW TRIAL" denying Erickson's motion.209
On April 22,2009, Erickson filed his second "NOTICE OF

20'

APPEAL.""^

See R Vol. 11, pp. 128 and 143.

"' See R Vol. 11, p. 129.

'"See R Vol. 11, pp. 133-134.
11, p. 134.
'''.See RVol. 11, pp. 136-137.
Z 0 5 ~ e e ~11,~ pp.
o l 137-138.
.
' " ~ e eVol.
~ 11, pp. 137-138.
207 See R Vol. 11, p. 138.
'''See R Vol. 11, pp. 147, 152-194.
See R VoI. 11, p. 198.
0I' See R Vol. 11, p. 2 10.
203 See R Vol.

"'
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ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Is the district court's decision that Erickson cannot raise any defenses involving

Bagley's wrongful conduct against the law?

2.

Can the plaintiff recover on the promissory note when Bagley failed to comply

with Wyoming Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(a) that prohibits business transactions with
clients?

3.

Does substantial evidence exist that Bagley's services were adequate

consideration for the $29,173.38promissory note?

4.

Did Bagley's acknowledged conflict of interest in representing Erickson in the

Chapter 12 predate its filing so as to preclude charging a portion of the $29,173.38 in attorney's
fees the court awarded?

5.

Did Bagley have a conflict of interest in representing Erickson and Kathleen

together in the Chapter 1 1 so as to preclude charging a portion of the $29,173.38in attorney's
fees the court awarded?
6.

Did the district court commit reversible error in failing to apply $830,$9,750,

$8,500,and $3,000as set off damages against the $29,173.38in attorney's fees the court
awarded?

7.

Did the district court commit reversible error at trial by refusing to allow

Erickson's expert witness to give her opinion regarding damages?

8.

Did the district court commit reversible error by allowing the plaintiff to offer the

expert testimony of Bagley at trial?

9.

Is Erickson entitled to costs and attorney's fees on appeal?
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION IS AGAINST THE LAW BECAUSE IT DOES
NOT ALLOW ERICKSON TO RAISE ANY DEFENSES INVOLVING BAGLEY'S
WRONGFUL CONDUCT.
This case involves two parts: Sirius I occurred when the trial court sua sponte granted

summary judgment in favor of Sirius, and Erickson successfully appealed. Sirius II refers to all
proceedings after the Supreme Court decided Sirius LC v. Erickson, 144 Idaho 38 (2007.) In

Sirius I, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the services Bagley performed could serve as
consideration for the Sirius note. The Supreme Court remanded the matter for further handling
that included determining whether the consideration was "adequate" in light of Erickson's
affirmative defenses, which included "set off' for Bagley's malpractice. The trial court in Sirius

II now has held that as a matter of law that "the affirmative defenses involving Mr. Bagley's
conduct, whether wrongful or not, are not applicable here."2" This court exercises free review
over issues of law. American Pension Services, Inc. v. Cornerstone Home Builders, LLC, 147
Idaho 638 (2009).
The district court is saying that the consideration, whether adequate or not, does not
matter even though the Supreme Court vacated "the district court's grant of summary judgment
with respect to Erickson's remaining affirmative defenses" and "remanded for further
proceedings on those issues," which included whether "there was inadequate and insufficient
consideration to support the agreements." Sirius LC v. Erickson, 144 Idaho 38,43, fn. 2,44
(2007). The Supreme Court clearly stated that although "we hold that Erickson received
consideration for the note, we do not opine as to the adequacy of the consideration" and left this
factual determination for the trial court. Id at 43, fn. 2.

See R Vol. 11, p. 136.
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If this Court had really thought that the sufficiency of Bagley's services was not
"applicable" as a matter of law, then this Court would not have remanded the case to conduct
discovery on those services and to test the adequacy of those services. Instead, this Court would
have simply ruled as a matter of law that Erickson was not entitled to any discovery on Bagley's
services because those services are legally irrelevant. If this Court's decision is to have any
meaning, then the trial court's conclusion that Bagley's services are "not applicable here" is
against the "law of the case."
Moreover, "[aln assignment is a transfer of rights or property from one person to
another." Foley v. Grigg, 144 Idaho 530,532 (2007). An assignee takes only those rights and
remedies the assignor had. Id. This means that the third party to an assignment has the same
defenses against the assignee as it had against the assignor. Id Here, Bagley "redirected" his
account receivable to Sirius. This is in substance an assignment that gives Erickson the same
defenses against Sirius as Erickson had against Bagley.
The court should construe the transaction as a contract in law for an assignment for the
purposes of bringing about justice and equity. Gray v. Tri-Way Const. Services, Inc., 147 Idaho
378 (2009). Otherwise, a crafty lawyer could avoid the consequences of his own malpractice by
having his client execute a promissory note to a third party entity the lawyer owns. Then after
the two-year statute of limitations period has passed, the third party entity could sue the client for
payment. The client could not file a counter claim because the third party entity did not provide
the services; the client could not file a third party complaint against the lawyer because the
statute of limitations had run; and the client could not raise the lawyer's negligence as a set off
because the lawyer, not the third party entity, provided the consideration. This would amount to
unassailable "super-consideration" that would deny justice and equity.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
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11.

PLAINTIFF CANNOT RECOVER ON THE PROMISSORY NOTE BECAUSE
BAGLEY VIOLATED WYOMING RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.8(al
THAT PROHIBITS BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS WITH CLIENTS.
"'An attorney's freedom to contract with a client is subject to the constraints of ethical

considerations."' Petit-Clair v. Nelson, 782 A.2d 960, 962 (N.J. Super. 2001); quotation omitted.
"Any transaction between an attorney and client is 'subject to close scrutiny."' Id. at 962;
quotation omitted. "An attorney in his relations with a client is bound to the highest degree of
fidelity and good faith. The strongest influences of public policy require strict adherence to such
a role of conduct."' Id. at 962-963; quotation omitted. "Consequently, an otherwise enforceable
agreement between an attorney and client is invalid 'if it runs afoul of ethical rules governing

' ~ L.L. C. v. Steward,
that relationship."' Id. at 963; quotation omitted. See also ~ a l l e ~ / 5 0venue,
153 P.3d 186 (Wash. 2007) ("Attorney fee agreements that violate applicable rules of
professional conduct are against public policy and unenforceable.")
In 1999, Wyoming followed Wyoming Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(a) that read as
follows:
Rule 1.8. Conflict of interest: prohibited transactions

(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly
acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client
unless:
the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest
(1)
are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in
writing to the client in a manner which can be reasonably understood by the
client;
the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advise of
(2)
independent counsel in the transaction; and
the client consents in writing thereto.
(3)
An attorney fee transaction in which the attorney secures payment with a promissory note
and a security interest that violates Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(a) is void and

Avenue, L. L. C. v. Steward, supra, 153 P.3d at 186 (holding that
unenforceable. ~alleyD0'~
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lawyer's note and deed of trust securing payment of past attorney's fees are void and
unenforceable unless lawyer stringently complies with Rule 1.8(a)); and Petit-Clair v. Nelson,

supra, 782 A.2d at 960 (holding that note and mortgage securing attorney's fees were invalid
where the lawyer failed to comply with Rule 1.8(a)).
By its express term, 1.8(a) designates an offending transaction as a "prohibited
transaction." Erickson submits that "prohibited" by law means "unlawful." An unlawful
transaction is void. Takahashi v. Pepper Tank & Contracting Co., 131 P.2d 339,354-355 (Wyo.
1942); and Hecht v. Acme Coal Co., 113 P. 788,790 (Wyo. 1911). Whether the security
agreement and transaction Bagley seeks to enforce through Sirius are "prohibited," "unlawful,"
and "void" because Bagley did not comply with the provisions of Rule 1.8(a) is a matter of law
over which this court exercises free review. American Pension Services, Inc. v. Cornerstone

Home Builders, LLC, supra, 147 Idaho at 638.
A.

Baglev Bears The Burden Of Proving Fairness, Equitv. And Comoliance With
Rule 1.8(a).

"'[Aln attorney-client transaction is prima facie fraudulent"' and presumptively invalid.

~ a l l e ~ / 5 0venue,
' ~ L. L.C. v. Steward, supra, 153 P.3d at 190; quotation omitted; P & M Enter:
v.

Murray, 680 A.2d 790, (N.J. App. Div. 1996). Consequently, "the burden of establishing

fairness and equity of the transactions rests upon the attorney."' Petit-Clair v. Nelson, supra, 782
A.2d at 962-963; quotation omitted.
"The burden of proving compliance with Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8 rests with the

'~
L.L.C. v. Steward, supra, 153 P.3d at 190. "[A] lawyer must prove
lawyer." ~ a l l e ~ / 5 0venue,
strict compliance with the safeguards of Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(a); full disclosure,
opportunity to consult outside counsel, and consent must be proved by the communications
between the attorney and the client." Id "The disclosure which accompanies an attorney-client
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transaction must be complete. Attorneys, to defend their actions, must prove they complied with
the 'stringent requirements imposed upon an attorney dealing with his or her client."' Id.
Moreover, "[tlhe burden is upon the lawyer to demonstrate that a real and meaningful

Avenue, L.L.C. v.
opportunity to seek independexit counsel was afforded to the client." ~alle~/50"
Steward, supra, 153 P.3d at 191. "The opportunity to seek independent advice must be real and
meaningful. It is not enough that at some moment in time an opportunity existed no matter how
brief or fleeting that opportunity might have been." Id. at 190.

B.

Rule 1.8(a) Applies To All Security Interests And To Anv Pecuniarv Interest
Adverse To A Client.

By its express terms, Rule 1.8(a) applies to all "security interests" a lawyer knowingly
acquires in his client's property. The "adverse" requirement applies only to "other pecuniary
interests." This must be so because all security interests are necessarily "adverse" to the person
whose property is subject to the security interest. Although the "adverse" requirement of Rule
1.8(a) applies only to "other pecuniary interests," case law holds that a mortgage on a client's
property given to the lawyer as security is "clearly" a security interest adverse to the client.

Petit-Clair v. Nelson, supra, 782 A.2d at 963; In re Taylor, 741 N.E.2d 1239 (Ind. 2001); and In
re Douglass, 859 A.2d 1069 (D.C. 2004).
C.

Rule 1 .&a)Also Applies -1'0,\I1 Rusiriess Pansacrions Including A I.aw\.er's
Taking A Note And Securilv Interestxo Secure Pavment Of Past Atrom~v'sFees.

Rule 1.8(a) also applies to all "business transactions" between a lawyer and his client. A
lawyer who takes a security interest in his client's real property to secure payment on a note for
payment ofpast attorney's fees engages in a "business transaction" with the client that invokes

'~
L. L.C. v. Steward, supra, 153 P.3d at 186.
the protections of Rule 1.8(a). ~ a l l e ~ / 5 0venue,
Such an agreement is not a fee agreement between a lawyer and client but in reality an
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
F:\CLIENTS\BDS\7453IPleadings\067
appellate brief doc

Page 32 of 48

agreement between a creditor and debtor that rises to a "business transaction" within the meaning
of Rule 1.8(a). Id. Here, the note and mortgage constitute a "business transaction" in addition to
being a "security interest."
D.

Bagley Has Not Complied With The Reauirements Of Rule 1.8(a).

The note and mortgage Bagley had Erickson sign to secure the payment of Bagley's
attorney's fees is a security interest and "an interest in the client's property adverse to the client."

In re Taylor, supra, 741 N.E.2d at 1242. Moreover, the note and mortgage Bagley obtained from
Avenue,
Erickson was a "business transaction" within the meaning of Rule 1&a). See Valley/50~~
L.L.C. v. Steward, supra, 153 P.3d at 186. Accordingly, Bagley was required to comply with
Rule 1.8(a) and in fact bears the burden of proof that he did comply with Rule 1.8(a). However,
as set forth below, Bagley did not comply with the requirements of Rule 1.8(a).
1.

"A fee agreement between a lawyer and a client, revised after the relationship has

been established on terms more favorable to the lawyer than originally agreed upon may be void
or voidable unless the attorney shows that the contract was fair and reasonable, free from undue
influence, and made after a fair and full disclosure of the facts on which it is predicated."

~alley/50'~
Avenue, L.L. C. v. Steward, supra, 153 P.3d at 189. A mortgage to secure a note for
past attorney's fees has been found to be unfair and unreasonable where it expands a client's
liability far beyond the terms the lawyer and client originally agreed to. Petit-Clair v. Nelson,

supra, 782 A.2d at 960.
The transaction and terms on which Bagley acquired his interest are unfair and
unreasonable and expand Erickson's liability far beyond the terms Erickson and Bagley
originally agreed to. Erickson mortgaged 172.35 acres to ~

'"See Sirius Exhibit 2.
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with a stated value on December 3, 1999 of $602,000.~'~
There were only two secured creditors
other than the Sirius note on the Deer Creek Property at the time Bagley filed the Chapter 12 on
December 3 , 1 9 9 9 . ~ 'One
~ creditor was FSB whose secured claim was $115,000, and the other
creditor was Wyoming Farm Loan Board whose secured claim was $70,000.~'~
Using the stated
value of $602,000 for the Deer Creek Property, Bagley obtained at least $417,000 of
unencumbered collateral to secure a note in the amount of $29,173.38.
Bagley's over secured position is far better for him considering the reality of the
situation. Erickson had assigned a $97,000 receivable to FSB who was applying the $97,000
receivable to pay off its $115,000 claim.216Giving credit for this $97,000 receivable increases
Bagley's over secured position to $514,000 on the $29,173.38 note. Even worse, the total value
of Erickson's real property was $1.3 million in which FSB and Wyoming Farm Loan Board also
held security for their $1 15,000 and $70,000 claims

This means that once FSB

and Wyoming Farm Loan Board were paid from the other properties sold in the Chapter 12,
Bagley would be the lone remaining secured creditor with security valued at $602,000 for his
$29,173.38 note thus making Bagley over secured by as much as $572,000.
Moreover, originally Bagley had agreed to represent Erickson for $140 per hour, and the
original agreement did not include any terms for security. The original agreement certainly did
not include giving Bagley a security interest over-securing Bagley between $417,000 and
$572,000. Any independent lawyer not wanting to commit malpractice would have advised
Erickson not to pledge his entire 172 acre farm with a net equity value between $417,000 and

See Erickson Exhibit D-30.
See Erickson Exhibit D-36.
"'See Erickson Exhibit D-36.
6I' See Erickson Exhibits D-32 and 36.
7I' See Erickson Exhibits D-30 and 36.
2'3

4I'
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$572,000 to secure Bagley's $29,173.28 note. Erickson submits that such an over-secured
position heavily in favor of Bagley is neither fair nor reasonable to Erickson.
Finally, Bagley committed malpractice by having the Chapter 11 dismissed and failing to
convert to a Chapter 12, represented Erickson under multiple conflicts of interest, and has no
records to justify the amount of the note. Thus, Bagley's having Erickson sign a note for
services he rendered under these circumstances cannot be said to be "fair and reasonable."
2.

Bagley did not fully disclose the transaction and terms in writing to Erickson at all

let alone in a manner Erickson could reasonably understand. The only documents that contain
the transaction and terms are the note and mortgage Erickson signed. Bagley was unable to
identify any separate writing, as case law requires, fully disclosing the transaction and the terms
to Erickson that he could then consent to as Rule 1.8(a) requires.'''

In re Estate of Brown, 930

A.2d 249,253 (D.C. 2007); In re Stephens, 851 N.E.2d 1256, 1258 (Ind. 2006); Lawyer

Disciplinary Board v. Barber, 566 S.E.2d 245,251 (W.Va. 2002); and Matter of Charfoos, 183
B.R. 131, 136-137 (Bankr.E.D. Mich. 1994.)
3.

There was no evidence that Bagley gave Erickson a reasonable opportunity to

seek the advice of independent counsel. Although Bagley testified that Erickson had a divorce
lawyer who included the debt to Bagley in the Marriage Settlement Agreement, there was no
evidence that Erickson ever had the opportunity to seek the advice of the divorce lawyer with
regard to the transaction. In fact, the Decree of Divorce was entered on October 19, 1999.'19
But Erickson signed the promissory note and mortgage on November 13, 1999."O Therefore, by
the time Erickson signed the promissory note and mortgage, the divorce case had been concluded
for nearly one month.
See TI Vol, 11. p. 82, L.19 through p. 84, L. 6.
See Sirius Exhibit 6.
220 See Sirius Exhibits 1 and 2.
2'8
2'9
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4.

Erickson did not consent in writing to the terms of the transaction. The only

written consent Bagley could point to is the Marriage Settlement Agreement the divorce lawyers
prepared and that Erickson signed on September 14, 1999 that references in Exhibit "B" a
secured debt to William D. Bagley for $24,000, not the actual note amount of $29,173.28.221
Moreover, the Marriage Settlement Agreement contains none of the terms of the transaction and
specifically does not even identify the property in which Bagley would claim a security interest
through Sirius nor does it identify ~ i r i u s Simply
. ~ ~ ~ affixing one's name to the Marriage
Settlement Agreement that references the debt to Bagley is not "informed consent" just as merely
signing a listing agreement is insufficient to show a client's "informed consent" in writing (In re

Estate of Brown, supra, 930 A.2d at 249) and merely signing a check is insufficient to show a
client's "informed consent" in writing. Lawyer Disciplinary Board v. Barber, supra, 566 S.E.2d
at 245.
E.

The Trial Court Misapplied Rule 1.8(a).

The trial court ruled that Bagley did not violate Rule 1.8(a) because "the note and securing
mortgage were provided as consideration and not as an adverse ownership, possessory, security or
other pecuniary interest." Otherwise, "no attorney could enter into agreements for payment as they
would be in conflict with their clients thereafter." Rule 1.8(a) applies when the attorney takes a
"security interest" in the client's property to secure his fees. The attorney has also entered a
"business transaction" because the relationship has changed from attomeylclient to creditorldebtor.
Contrary to the court's conclusion, an attorney can enter into an agreement for payment without
running afoul of Rule 1.8. But when the agreement involves a note and mortgage months after

221
222

See Sirius Exhibit 3.
See Sirius Exhibit 3.
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representation began, the attorney obtains a "security interest" and the agreement becomes a
"prohibited transaction" absent compliance with Rule 1.8(a),
111.

NO SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPEI'EN'I' EVIDESCE EXISTS THAI' BAGLEY'S
SERVICES WERF ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION FOR TIIE $29.173.38
PROMISSORY NOTE.
"When review of a trial court's decision involves entwined questions of law and fact," the

Supreme Court exercises "free review over questions of law" and upholds "factual findings
supported by substantial and competent evidence." Ada County Highway Dist. v. Total Success

Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360 (2008.)
Here, the trial court made the factual finding that the legal work Bagley performed for
Erickson was "adequate" to support the note because Bagley's attorney's fees are reasonable.223
The court applied the rule that "[a] lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an
unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses." Wyo. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5. Thus,
the trial court found that Bagley provided legal services reasonably valued at $29,173.38or the
amount of the note. However, no substantial and competent evidence exists to support the
court's finding. In fact, undisputed evidence exists that Bagley's attorney's fees of $29,173.38
are unreasonable and therefore inadequate consideration for the promissory note.
A.

No Evidence Exists To Support A Finding That Bagley's Chapter 1 1 Fee Of
$28,668.57Is Reasonable.

Bagley charged $28,668.57for the work he performed in the Chapter 11. (This number is
computed by taking the prior balance from June 3, 1998 from a post dismissal billing statement
. ) there
~ ~ ~was no
of $23,668.57and adding to it the $5,000retainer Erickson paid ~ a g l e ~But
evidence that this amount was reasonable for the Chapter 11. In fact, Bagley did not even review
or identify the work he performed in the Chapter 1 1 and has no attorney billings to document
223

See Tr Vol. 11, p. 133.

'"See Erickson Exhibit C-5 1.
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what services he performed in the Chapter 1

Bagley can provide no itemization or show

what he actually charged for the work in the Chapter 1

Bagley can provide no accounting

or breakdown for what he charged to arrive at the total figure of $28,66~.57.~"Bagley cannot
locate his billings to justify his attorney's fees for the Chapter 11 and has made no effort to
recreate the work he performed for his services.228Thus, there was simply no substantial and
competent evidence to support a factual finding that $28,668.57 for the work he performed in the
Chapter 11 was reasonable.
To the contrary, Bagley admits that he did not perform some of his work "efficiently" as
is the case where Bagley filed multiple unsuccessful perfunctory applications to retain
professionals.229Bagley further admits that it is not reasonable for him to charge Erickson for
the successive applications to retain professions?30 But Bagley did charge for all the successive
applications he filed in obtaining the orders to appoint professionals?31
Furthermore, the "UNITED STATES TRUSTEE'S STATUS REPORT" dated April 19,
1999 refers to a March 1999 monthly financial report and states that "[tlhe debtor states on the
report that Mr. Bagley is owed $7,000 in fees over the retainer."232 This statement is attributable
to Bagley who prepared the March 1999 report himself?33 The import of this statement is that
$7,000 plus the original $5,000 retainer equals $12,000 in fees through March 1999 for a case
dismissed in May 1999. Since Bagley's post dismissal billing statements show a previous

"'See Bagley Depo., 69: 19-24.
'"See Bagley Depo., 70:15-19.
227
See Bagley Depo., 70:20-25.
'"See Bagley Depo., 69:s-11.
229 See Bagley Depo., 143:21-22.
2 3 9 e eBagley Depo., 146:15-19.
231 See Bagley Depo., 141:s-11.
232 See Erickson Exhibit A-82, p. 3 (emphasis added).
'"See Tr Vol. 11, p. 127, LL. 7-10.
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balance before June 3, 1999 of $~3,668.57?~~
Bagley must have billed $1 1,668.57 for services
for April 1999, May 1999, and the first two days in June 1999. However, Bagley provided no

evidence at trial explaining what services he even performed during this time, although whatever
he did resulted in a dismissal for failure to prosecute.
Bagley also charged Erickson $165 per hour for the work he performed in the Chapter
11.235Yet, Bagley's application for employment, the court order:36 and Bagley's verified
statement all say that he would charge $140 per

At a minimum, Erickson would be

entitled to a credit of $25 per hour for all the hours Bagley has charged for services performed in
the Chapter 11 even assuming all his hours were reasonable.
Bagley could have and should have converted the Chapter 11 to a Chapter 12. See 11
U.S.C. Section 1112(d). Bagley himself testified that he would have initially filed this case as a
Chapter 12 if it had been available.238And Bagley never considered converting to a Chapter 12
until after the Chapter 11 was dismissed.239Bagley never even knew that he could have
converted the Chapter 11 to a Chapter 1 2 . ~ ~Shively
'
testified that Bagley's failure to convert
from a Chapter 11 to a Chapter 12 under these facts was conduct below the standard of care
because a Chapter 12 is much better for farmers and

rancher^:^' and Bagley never disputed

Shively's testimony on this point.
Bagley's attorney's fee of $28,668.57 for the failed Chapter 11 is unreasonable. Shively
got the Chapter 12 plan approved, and Erickson successfully completed the plan ultimately
receiving a Chapter 12 discharge order. This proves that if Bagley had converted to a Chapter 12
See Erickson Exhibit C-5 1.
See Bagley Depo., 22:24-23:5; 37:21-22:3.
236 See Erickson Exhibits A-25 and A-36.
237 See Erickson Exhibit A-33.
238SeeBagley Depo., 7:9-16; 41:20-42:2.
239 See Bagley Depo., 47:5-8.
240 See Bagley Depo., 42: 12-24.
241 See Tr Vol. 11, p. 64, LL. 14-17.
234

235
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and performed competently, he too could have gotten a Chapter 12 plan approved, completed the
plan, ultimately received a discharge order-all

without having to incur $28,668.57 in attorney's

fees for a dismissed Chapter 11 caused by Bagley's failure to prosecute. In the end, Bagley
charged Erickson $28,668.57 for a "no value Chapter 11 dismissal" when Erickson should have
gotten a valuable Chapter 12 confirmation just like Shively got Erickson and that Erickson paid
Shively to get.
B.

The Evidence Is Undisputed That A Portion Of Baglev's Attornev's Fees
Supporting The Note Are For Attorney's Fees Baaley Unreasonably Charged
While Representing. Erickson Under A Conflict Of Interest.

"'The relationship of attorney and client is an extremely delicate and fiduciary one
[Clourts jealously hold [the attorney] to the utmost good faith in the discharge of his duty.'
Misconduct in violation of a statute or acts against public policy, or in breach of an attorney's
fiduciary duty to his client, may support a complete forfeiture of fees." Crawford v. Logan, 656
S.W.2d 360,364 (Tenn. 1983) (quotation and citation omitted); see also Simpson Performance

Products, Inc. v. Robert JK Horn, PC.,92 P.3d 283,287 (Wyo. 2004) (forfeiture of attorney's
fees incurred while the lawyer has a conflict of interest is appropriate); Cal Pak Delivery, Inc. v.

United Parcel Service, Inc., 52 Cal.App.4th 1, 14 (1997) (in conflict of interest cases an attorney
who violates ethical duties to a client is not entitled to a fee for services); In re Spanjer Bros.,

Inc., 191 B.R. 738 (Bkrtcy.N.D.111. 1996) (if a debtor's attorney does not satisfy the
disinterestedness requirements, then the bankruptcy court must deny attorney's fees for the
period that the conflict existed).
Moreover, "a client need not prove actual damages in order to obtain forfeiture of an
attorney's fee for the attorney's breach of fiduciary duty to the client." Burrow v. Arce, 997
S.W.2d 229,240 (Tx. 1999); Frank v. Bloom, 634 F.2d 1245 (1Oth.Cir. 1980) Erickson submits
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that Bagley's charging Erickson attorney's fees while Bagley had a conflict of interest is per se
unreasonable.
1.

Bagley's Had A Conflict Of Interest In Representing Erickson In Preparing
For The Chapter 12 Filing.

The court in the Chapter 12 dismissed Bagley from further representation after it found
Bagley was a

Erickson submits that Bagley's "creditor conflict" that prevented

Bagley from representing Erickson in the Chapter 12 also prevented him from performing work
necessary to prepare the Chapter 12 for filing. If an attorney cannot represent a client in a
Chapter 12 because the attorney is also a creditor, then the attorney cannot represent the client in
preparing for the Chapter 12 filing if that attorney is or will be a creditor when the Chapter 12
petition is filed.
Bagley agrees that he had a "creditor conflict" in representing Erickson in the Chapter 12
before Erickson signed the promissory note.243In fact, Bagley agrees that he had such a conflict

for filing the Chapter 12 petition as early as June 28, 1999 because he definitely was one of
Erickson's creditors at that time.244 In actuality, Bagley's conflict started as early as June 3, 1999
because Bagley admits that by that time he was "preparing and organizing to file the Chapter 12
petition."245 Bagley obviously was required to disclose to Erickson that he would have a conflict
representing Erickson in a Chapter 12. Bagley admits that he did not disclose the conflict to
Erickson before he filed the Chapter 12 because he did not even see the conflict as an
Erickson testified that he would not have used Bagley as his attorney to file the Chapter 12 if

See Erickson Exhibits D-156-157.
See Bagley Depo., 84:12-17.
See Bagley Depo., 8 1 :23-82:s.
245
See Bagley Depo., 80:22-81:1.
2 4 6 ~ Bagley
ee
Depo., 88:7-14.
242
2"
244
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Bagley had disclosed to him the conflict that Bagley would have in the Chapter 12.247
Accordingly, Bagley is not entitled to any attorney's fees for preparation of the Chapter 12.
2.

Bagley Had A Conflict Of Interest In Representinp Erickson And His Wife
Together In The Chapter 11.

Bagley prepared and filed a motion to add Kathleen as a ~ o d e b t o r ~while
~ ' representing
Erickson and while the Ericksons were going through a divorce.249Kathleen signed the motion
on December 14, 1998.~~'
Following his unsuccessful motion, Bagley filed a separate Chapter
11 petition as counsel for Kathleen while Bagley still represented Erickson and while the
Ericksons' divorce was still pending.251Bagley represented Kathleen at least as late as
September 27, 1999.~~'
Erickson submits that just as one attorney could not represent both Kathleen and Erickson
in their divorce, Bagley could not represent both Kathleen and Erickson in the same or separate
Chapter 11 proceedings addressing joint property issues because Kathleen and Erickson were
dividing up their property in the divorce. Even Bagley has admitted that "there might be a
potential conflict" saying, "I could see maybe there is a potential conflict" in representing both
Erickson and Kathleen in bankruptcy while they had a pending divorce.253Bagley explained,
"they would have had a divergent interest in preserving the property, maybe one says don't
preserve it and the other says do preserve it."254 This explains why on cross examination Bagley
agreed that from "day one" there was an issue in the divorce court that Erickson wanted to retain

See Tr Vol. I, p. 28, L. 18 through p. 29 L. 2
See Erickson Exhibit A-35.
249 See Erickson Exhibit A-35.
250 See Erickson Exhibit A-35.
25' See Erickson Exhibit B-2.
252 See Erickson Exhibit C-55.
"'See Bagley Depo., p. 16, LL. 4-7.
"'See Bagley Depo., p. 16, LL. 8-13.
247

248
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possession of the farm whereas Kathleen did not want to.255Erickson testified that he wanted to
save his farm and continue to farm whereas Kathleen wanted to sell the farm and divide the
Bagley never disclosed to Erickson that there was at least a potential conflict of interest
in his representing both Erickson and ~ a t h l e e n . ' ~ ~
Erickson submits that Bagley could represent both Erickson and Kathleen at the same
time only if Kathleen and Erickson had an agreement on how to divide their property. That
agreement did not come until Kathleen and Erickson signed the Marital Settlement Agreement
on October 12, 1999. As a result of Bagley's representing both Erickson and Kathleen while
they were getting divorced and before they signed the Marital Settlement Agreement on October
12, 1999, Bagley represented Erickson under a conflict of interest. Erickson submits that
Bagley's charging Erickson attorney's fees while representing Erickson under a conflict of
interest is unreasonable. Thus, Bagley's services are inadequate consideration for the note.
IV.

SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT AN AWARD
OF $29.173.38 BECAUSE THE COURT FAILED TO APPLY $3,000, $830, $9,750,
AND $8.500 AS SET OFF DAMAGES.
Erickson paid Bagley $3,000 to represent him in the Chapter 12 where the court

discharged Bagley because he had a conflict of interest. Because Bagley had a conflict of
interest in representing Erickson in the Chapter 12, Bagley is not entitled to the $3,000. If
Bagley had converted to a Chapter 12, Bagley would not have needed to file any bankruptcy
petition for ~ a t h l e e n 'thus
~ ~ avoiding $830 for the filing fee for Kathleen's Chapter 11 petition
that Erickson paid.259 The trial court did not give any credit either for the $3,000 or the $830.
FSB and FNB recovered attorney's fees in the Chapter 12 for the work their attorneys performed

'*'See Bagley Depo., 17:2-18:l.
'56SeeTrVol.11, p. 22, LL. 11-21; see Bagley Depo., p. 17, L. 10 through p. 18, L. 1.
See Bagley Depo., p. 163, L. 21 through p. 164, L. 3; see Tr Vol. 11, p. 29, LL. 3-6.
See Tr Vol. I, p. 71, L. 5 through p. 73, L. 21; see also 11 USC $ 1201.
2 5 9 ~ Erickson
ee
Exhibit B-I.
257
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in the Chapter 11 that included the work they did in bringing motions to dismiss the Chapter

1 1.260Bagley testified that Erickson had to pay these creditors' attorney's fees for the work the
creditors' attorneys did in the dismissed Chapter 11.26' Shively testified that FSB incurred and
recovered conservatively $9,750 in attorney's fees262and that FNB incurred and recovered
conservatively $8,500 in attorney's fees.263There was no evidence to contradict these figures.
But the court gave Erickson no credit for these damages.
V.

1'11E COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR AT TRIAI. BY REFUSING AND
AI-LOWING EXPERT TESTIMONY.

"This Court reviews trial court decisions admitting or excluding evidence, including the
testimony of expert witnesses, under the abuse of discretion standard." Clark v. Kelin, 137 Idaho
154, 156 (2002). "In the case of an incorrect ruling regarding evidence, a new trial is merited
only if the error affects a substantial right of one of the parties." Id. See also Lambert v.

Northwestern Nut. Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 780 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding that exclusion of expert
witness testimony was prejudicial error).
A.

The Trial Court Imorooerlv Excluded Expert Testimony From Shively.

Shively gave her opinion that a reasonable amount of attorney's fees for the work Bagley
performed would have been $2,227.50.'~~She based this amount on the bankruptcy code section
that would have applied to any fee request Bagley might have made had the court not dismissed
the Chapter 11.265 She based her opinion on her review of the entire Chapter 11 file, her
experience in filing 10-15 Chapter 11 fee applications, her experience with Chapter 11 and

260SeeTr Vol. I, p. 190, L. 16 throughp. 192, L. 1 ; p. 193, L. 13 through p. 194, L. 18; p. 197, L. 13 through p. 198,
L. 9.
26'SeeBagley Depo., p. 62, LL. 10-17; p. 63, L. 7-9; p. 64, L. 1 through p. 65, L. 4; p. 192, L. 13 through p. 194, L.
9.
262 See Tr Vol. I , p. 193, LL. 13- 19.
263 See Tr Vol. I, p. 197, LL. 13-24.
264 See Tr Vol. I, p. 199, L. 6 through p. 200, L. 4.
265
SeeTr Vol. I , p. 199, L. 6-20.
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Chapter 12 fee applications other attorneys have filed because the requirements are the same for
both Chapter 11 and Chapter 12, her 22 years experience, and the value of the work Bagley
performed and conferred as the rule requires.266However, the court would not admit or consider
Shively's testimony because earlier she testified generally that she does not "have specialized
training in determining damages"267and that in her practice she hires damage experts.268
The court abused its discretion in excluding Shively's opinion because the court
incorrectly viewed Shively's general statement that she does not "have specialized training in
determining damages" as disqualifying her from offering an opinion on what a reasonable
attorney's fee would be for Bagley to have charged for the work that he did perform in the
Chapter 11 rather than determining whether sufficient foundation was laid based on her training
and experience for Shively to offer her opinion. Erickson submits that Shively was qualified
through her training and experience to offer the opinion and that the court's refusal to admit the
opinion affected Erickson's substantial right to have the court even consider that the reasonable
value of Bagley's attorney's fees was $2,227.50 rather than $29,173.38 especially when Erickson
had already paid Bagley a $5,000 retainer.
B.

The Trial Court Imvroverlv Allowed Expert Testimony From Bapley.

A court's failure to exclude expert testimony that was not properly disclosed and that
prejudices the opposing party constitutes an abuse of discretion. Clark v. Raty, 137 Idaho 343,
347 (Ct.App. 2002). "[Fjailure to meet the requirements of Rule 26 'typically' results in
exclusion of the proffered evidence. The potential for prejudice to the opposing party from the
admission of evidence that was not disclosed in discovery is particularly acute with respect to
expert testimony, for as the court noted in Radmer, '[elffective cross-examination of an expert
TI Vol. I , p. 200, L. 22 - p. 203, L. 7.
Tr Vol. 1, p. 36, LL. 18-21 (emphasis added); p. 203, LL. 8-17.
268 See Tr Vol. I, p. 36, LL. 18-21 (emphasis added); p. 203, LL. 8-17.
266 See
267 See

APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
F:\CLIENTS\BDS\7453IPleadings\067
appellate briefdoc

Page 45 of 48

witness requires advance preparation,' and 'effective rebuttal requires advance knowledge of the
line of testimony of the other side."' Clark, supra, at 347 (quoting Radmer v. Ford Motor Co.,

120 Idaho 86, 89 (1991)).
Here, the only witness Sirius called at trial was William Bagley whom the court allowed
to offer expert testimony that Sirius never disclosed. Erickson filed a written objection269
because Sirius had failed to disclose Bagley as an expert witness in its discovery responses (even
though Erickson specifically asked for this information)270and failed to "disclose in writing"
Bagley as an expert witness "together with a summary of the testimony" Bagley intended to
offer, as required in the "ORDER FOR TRIAL, PRE-TRIAL SCHEDULE, AND PRE-TRIAL

CONFERENCE."^^'

The objection sought an order precluding Bagley from testifying as an

expert witness or, alternatively, a continuance for Erickson to obtain in discovery Bagley's expert
opinions and the bases thereof.272The court denied the objection and motion for a
continuance.273The court further overruled Erickson's renewed objection during trial allowing
Bagley to testify as an expert.274
Erickson submits that the court's allowing Bagley's expert testimony constituted an
irregularity in the proceedings of the trial that prevented Erickson from having a fair trial under
Idaho case law as set out in Clark and Radmer. Because counsel for Erickson did not have
Bagley's opinions and the bases thereof before trial to prepare an effective cross-examination,
counsel for Erickson's cross-examination of Bagley was like playing "pin the tail on the donkey"
rather than a "surgical strike." The trial court lost its patience in this two day trial expressing its
R Vol. 11, p. 82.
R Vol. 11,
30-3 1.
27i See R Vol. 11, p. 83; see "ORDER FOR TRIAL, PRE-TRIAL SCHEDULE, AND PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE"
dated August 9,2007 as a document contained in the augmented record on appeal.
272 See R Vol. 11, pp. 82-85.
273 See Minute Entry and Order dated June 25,2007 as a document contained in the augmented record on appeal.
274 See Tr Vol. 11., p. 61 LL. 9-21.
269 See
270 See

pp.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL
F:\CLlENTS\BDS\7453\Pleadings\O67
appellate briefdoc

Page 46 of 48

frustration at counsel for Erickson's patchwork cross-examination sarcastically saying, "Let's
spend another day on this,"275 and, "It is cumulative, but if Mr. Smith wants to waste the time
doing it, go ahead, Mr. Smith. I don't know where it is going to get you, but go ahead."276 In the
end, Erickson was prejudiced by the court's allowing Bagley to testify as an expert.
VI.

DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL.
Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) mandates an award of attorney's fees in actions to recover

on a promissory note or other negotiable instrument both at the trial level and on appeal. LC. §
12-120(3.) Erickson v. Flynn, 138 Idaho 430,438,64 P.3d 959,967 (Ct.App. 2002);

Intermountain Forest Mgmt., Inc. v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 136 Idaho 233,238, 31 P.3d 921,
926 (2001). Idaho Appellate Rule 40 allows an award of costs "as a matter of course to the
prevailing party unless otherwise provided by law or order of the Court." I.A.R. 40(a). Because
this Court should reverse the district court's judgment, this Court should also award Erickson his
attorney's fees incurred in this action at the trial level and on appeal. The Court should also
award Erickson his costs incurred in pursuing this appeal. I.A.R. 40.

275 See TI Vol. 11, p. 1 1 1, LL. 12-13
2 7 6 ~ e e ~ r11,
~ p.
o l 112,
. LL. 15-17.
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CONCLUSION
For all the reasons set forth in this Opening Brief, Erickson respectfully requests that the
court reverse the judgment entered against Erickson and remand to the district court for further
handling.
DATED this y d a y of October, 2009.
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